This article will analyse recent interpretations of the 'informer' as a subject of political and historical significance for a balanced understanding of the trajectory of the Provisional Republican movement. It will do so in part through a discussion of some recent fiction and memoir-writing devoted to the figure of the informer. Specifically, this will involve an exploration of the recent fictional re-imagination of the real-life case of Denis Donaldson, by the French journalist Sorj Chalandon (Mon traître, 2007 and Retour à Killybegs, 2011). 1 In the first section, the article analyses the historical evolution of the phenomenon and recent revelations regarding the apparently widespread existence of informers in the movement during the Troubles. This section engages with the academic debate concerning the effects of these revelations upon the morale and internal political culture of the republican movement; it is argued here that the 'Republican family' has been significantly affected by these disclosures in the 'post-conflict' era, and that they have become an important element in the contestation between leadership supporters and 'dissenters' within contemporary republicanism. The second section utilises old and new literary representations of 'the informer', particularly based around Liam O'Flaherty's The Informer and Chalandon's work, to discuss continuities and changes in the image and perception of this phenomenon. It is argued that the interweaving of fiction with real-life and factual historical detail is a particularly appropriate means of interpreting the role and effects of the informer. This article begins from the premise that the republican movement in Ireland, encompassing both the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Sinn Féin (SF), in its many historical guises, has been characterised by a political and organisational culture marked by clandestine and conspiratorial behaviour. This is not surprising, given the nature of its armed campaign against the British state during the course of much of its existence. From 1970 until at least the restored IRA ceasefire of 1997, the Provisional republican movement exhibited an internal culture immersed in military elitism, which placed a significant emphasis upon the necessity of unity in action, a clear hierarchy of control within the movement, and a firm commitment to discipline within the ranks of both the 'army', and the political 'party'.
Introduction
"Do you know what the trees say when the axe appears in the forest? Look, the handle is one of our own!" 2 betrayer, the fountainhead of all Irish misery and a convenient scapegoat for centuries of glorious failure.' 6 Smyth has put forward a more nuanced position, and is sceptical regarding any supposed 'national genius for deceit'; still, he recognises that betrayal is 'deeply embedded within Irish history -the punctuation and the grammar of the Irish historical narrative.' 7 Dudai concurs with the idea of the informer as a 'folk devil', and 'one of the last "unforgiven" categories of conflict protagonists', with many informers still ostracised and living in exile, sometimes provided with new identities. 8 Dudai makes the important point that in the post-conflict era in Northern Ireland, the role and function of 'informers' during the conflict remains unamenable to interpretation within the prevailing 'human rights' or 'transitional justice' discourses.
There is some debate in recent literature devoted to the Provisionals regarding the extent to which the movement had been successfully penetrated by the security forces by the early 1990s. It has been argued that the use of informers by the state, allied with the new technologies of surveillance available to the security forces, had rendered IRA operations increasingly ineffective, notwithstanding the impact of 'spectaculars' (such as the bombings in the City of London in 1992 and 1993). 9 For instance, Frampton has put forward the hypothesis that the Republican movement opted for peace, at least in part due to the recognition that the IRA's capacities had been effectively blunted by infiltration. 10 As IRA operator, Gerry Bradley, lamented in his memoir, 'maybe nine out of ten' IRA attacks were foiled, often due to prior police or army intelligence, during these years. 11 Matthew Teague, a freelance journalist who interviewed 'Kevin Fulton' (a British soldier from Newry, Co. Down who infiltrated the IRA on behalf of British intelligence), was bewildered by the extent of the informer network that was revealed to him:
'I said [to 'Fulton'] , is there anybody in the IRA who's not a British spy? And he just sort of held out his hands and he said, "You tell me." I think that cuts right to the heart of the British strategy. They interwove themselves so profoundly with the IRA that it became hard to distinguish between the British and the IRA members. And by that point you've diluted the movement, or at least seeded mistrust so deeply that it just can't stand anymore.' 12 Urban argued in 1992 that 'it has never been in the interests either of the British government or the IRA to publicize the degree to which the republican heartlands are penetrated by informers.' 13 However, whilst this might have applied during the conflict, it may well be the
case that in what is ostensibly a post-conflict environment, these interests could have changed. It has also been argued that as well as intelligence about military operations, the informers provided crucial details of the political thinking at the apex of the movement: 'it has become blindingly obvious that the British had a deep insight into the direction that sections of the IRA leadership, most critically its Belfast-based commanders, wished the organisation to travel.' 14 However, in a partially contrasting view, Leahy has argued that the timing of the IRA's ceasefire in 1994 cannot be adequately explained by security force intelligence successes, and that the damage caused by informers was, in fact, limited. This was due to the 'closed' character of rural IRA units, the cell structure of the organisation in urban areas (particularly Belfast), and the relative isolation of the leadership from the movement's rankand-file. 15 These factors 'prevented the British state from containing the IRA via spies to any considerable extent between 1976 and 1994.' 16 Moreover, the IRA could still operate successfully despite the existence of informers at a senior level within the movement. Indeed, for informers to be effective, and protected from exposure, certain 'operations' had to be permitted to proceed, even if there may have been prior warning for the security forces.
Although it is not the purpose of this paper to adjudicate in this argument, there is some merit in both positions: it seems reasonable to accept that political calculations were at least as significant in the Provisionals' decision to move away from 'armed struggle' as the 5 limitations imposed upon the purely military or operational capacity of the IRA. Nonetheless, the retrospective disclosure of the apparent scale of the British 'human intelligence' operation among both republican and loyalist paramilitaries (even if incomplete), does suggest that the state may have enjoyed unacknowledged access to the political thinking of the Provisional leadership, and its factional debates, as well as its relationship to the movement's base. 17 Therefore, it could better judge accurately what kind of compromise was necessary and achievable to bring the vast majority of republicans into a future without the IRA. Many socalled dissident republicans would argue that this was also a future without republicanism as an ideology or set of strategic goals. 18 The extent to which the use of informers contributed to the strategic containment of the republican movement, if not the defeat of the IRA campaign as such, has become a key component of the post-conflict contestation within what might be broadly understood as the 'republican family'. 19 The main objective of the current article, however, is to focus upon the ways in which the cultural-historical interpretation of the 'informer' has reflected and shaped internal republican organisation and politics.
The 'Informer' and Republican Organisation and Culture
The Provisional IRA restored its ceasefire in July 1997, and brought a definitive end Fulton', who infiltrated the IRA with the express intention of undermining it, was deeply concerned that once he had been 'green-booked' (a reference to the training that all IRA volunteers were supposed to undergo, after they had been accepted within the organisation), if his subterfuge was exposed, he 'could be investigated, tried and executed by the IRA's internal security [...] The IRA had a licence to act as judge, jury and executioner if I was suspected of being a tout.' 40 However, it was not always true that alleged informers were killed; a range of punishments were used over the years, including beatings and shootings (often in the knees or ankles), forced exile, curfews, 'tarring and feathering' for women in republican districts suspected of liaising with British army personnel, and so on. It was also the case that, periodically, the movement would offer time-limited amnesties, promising that anyone who came forward to the republican movement, and admitted openly they had provided information to the security forces, would not be harmed. 41 The motivations that led individuals to become informers were often complex and diverse, and could change over time. Blackmail was certainly used by the security forces: the police and army could either threaten to expose misconduct by an individual, or they might offer the prospect of immunity from prosecution (or, at the least, a reduced sentence), if an individual who had been arrested was willing to work for them. 42 'Agent handlers' would also seek to entice co-operation through the promise of financial inducements; this pragmatic consideration ought not to be under-estimated in an environment where unemployment was rife. On the other hand, the amounts concerned were usually relatively small. Chalandon, in his afterword to My Traitor, seems to imply that Donaldson had betrayed the cause 'for a few thousand pounds sterling', but the specific motivation in this case remains obscure (see below). 43 Personal grudges, or spite and a desire for revenge, might also provoke a willingness to inform. Psychological flaws, such as a sense of self-importance, or the thrill of danger, might play a role. 44 It should also be recognised that at least some informers took a political decision to work for the security forces; whether through ideological conviction, or moral qualms concerning the strategy and tactics of the IRA, some saw it as their duty to aid the state in its fight against terrorism. Of course, republicans had good reason to denigrate the motivation of such informers, and particularly to deny the accusations of those such as Seán O'Callaghan, who alleged that the Provisionals had conducted a sectarian campaign of violence. 45 Cochrane has argued that 'an objective examination of the literature, particularly material written by informants within the Republican movement, demonstrates that in the main, those who sought to collude with the security forces did so freely, without coercion, in a personal effort to thwart the actions of their compatriots'. 46 We can also distinguish between those who joined the republican movement in good faith, and who were subsequently 'turned' 48 for whatever reason, and those (like 'Kevin Fulton') who were opposed to the IRA from the outset, and only joined (or, in the case of O'Callaghan, rejoined) in order to infiltrate the organisation. Dillon argued that the latter should be categorised as 'agents', and 'Fulton' was insistent in his memoir that he should not be considered as an 'informer', given his implacable opposition from the start to the republican movement, and his willingness to risk all by infiltrating the IRA: 'I'm not a grass. They will be understanding, they will be family and will promise to cherish him through thick and thin.
It is all a lie. The informer's fate is to be chewed up and spat out. This distrust of outsiders made South Armagh especially difficult for the security forces to breach; when they were able to recruit informers from the local area, they were rarely IRA men, but they were well-integrated in the community: for instance, postman Paddy McEntee or grain merchant (and cross-border smuggler) John McAnulty. It proved extremely difficult for their handlers to meet them in safety such was the network of 'eyes and ears' that operated on behalf of the republican movement across the countryside. Both McEntee and
McAnulty were killed, and their bodies dumped on border roads, after 'interrogation' in one of a number of properties that the South Armagh brigade (and later the IRA's internal security squad) had set up specifically for the purpose. 57 They were two of 18 suspected informers killed in South Armagh between the early 1970s and 1997 (approximately half of whom were local men, and the other half IRA volunteers from elsewhere, who were transported to the area for interrogation, before being shot in the head). 58 The question of communal response to the killings of suspected informers is also a sensitive topic for republicans. Broadly speaking, in highly supportive areas like South Armagh, the killing of informers was condoned by many, both inside and outside the movement itself: as long-time SF councillor in Crossmaglen, Jim McAllister, stated, 'the informer is a despised creature.' 59 However, the killing and mutilation of informers (whose bodies often bore the marks of torture, in the effort to wring 'confessions' from the suspect) was regularly denounced from the pulpit, and on occasion the community could demonstrate its unease concerning specific deaths; for example, in the case of McEntee, a popular local figure, there was allegedly 'an unprecedented wave of anger' at his killing, although
McAllister argued that this dissipated once the republican movement made clear the extent of his collusion with the authorities. 60 There are also some discrepancies in the accounts of the attitude of republicans and the wider community to the families of those killed as informers:
Hart recounts that a middle-aged man in a pub in Cork city was pointed out to him as 'the informer', when he was in fact the son of someone who had been suspected of informing seventy years earlier during the War of Independence! 61 The British officer, Robert Nairac, 'Nolan''s motivation for informing is 'wholly personal and apolitical'; it is portrayed as stemming, above all, from his dire financial circumstances; he is painted as a strong physical specimen, but without any political depth. 77 Whilst his extreme poverty, allied with subnormal mental faculties, are not presented as an excuse for his decision to betray his colleague, it is the case that 'Nolan' is shown to be both petrified and stupefied by the prospect of informing. Still, the lure of the £20 reward is enough for him to be 'turned'; there is no role for an 'agent-handler', or careful consideration of the risks involved, in this account. The decision is presented as a spur-of-the-moment one; in Ford's film, the seed of 'Nolan''s betrayal is planted when he sees an advertisement for passage to the United States (costing £10 per person). The reward money would be sufficient for him to escape with his sometime girlfriend, 'Katie Fox', herself a former member of the Revolutionary organisation expelled for 'public prostitution'. 78 Even though 'McPhillip' had been suspended from the movement for an incident in which the secretary of the Farm workers' union was shot dead, nonetheless 'Gallagher' is insistent that the informer must be rooted out. 'Gypo' finds himself psychologically bifurcated; he wishes to unburden himself to 'Gallagher', but realises the consequences: 'for a moment he contemplated the man who had gone into the police-station as a being apart from himself.' 79 For 'Gallagher', 'it's really no business of the Organisation, because Frank had ceased to be a member. He was only an ordinary civilian criminal as far as we are concerned. But an informer is an informer. He's got to be wiped out like the first sign of a plague as soon as he's spotted. He's a common enemy.' 80 'Gallagher' is deeply suspicious of 'Gypo''s shifty behaviour, and new-found and unaccountable wealth; as a trap, he offers 'Gypo' a route back into the organisation, if he helps to unmask the traitor. Despite his efforts in the court proceedings of the Revolutionary organisation to pin the blame on the innocent 'Rat Mulligan', it is 'Gypo' who ends up being trapped by the wily 'Gallagher' into admitting his perfidy. O'Flaherty describes the usually rational and calculating 'Gallagher' as 'demented, drunk with the fury of his hatred' for the informer. 81 Eventually, despite his escape from custody, 'Gypo' is tracked down and shot dead in a church.
If The Informer has been interpreted as a 'mythogenic' novel, in Sheeran's suggestive phrase, and full of 'creative contradictions', it is still slightly odd that it has come to be Although found guilty and sentenced to eight years, Morrison protested his innocence, and continued to press for an overturning of his conviction, which eventually occurred. 87 According to Ed Moloney, Morrison had been acting, on behalf of the IRA Army Council, alongside members of the IRA's internal security counter-intelligence unit, which was tasked with rooting out informers within the organisation. 88 This was a hugely significant case, not only because a key member of the republican leadership was arrested and imprisoned, but also due to the strong suspicion that the security identity, several murders were allowed to proceed. 89 In perhaps the most notorious incident of alleged security force collusion in terrorist activities designed to provide cover for an informer, it has been argued that loyalist agent, Brian Nelson, was steered away from targeting Stakeknife, and instead the Ulster Defence Association killed another (retired)
republican, Francisco Notarantonio (who had the misfortune to also be of Italian descent). 90 Although Scappaticci denied he had been an informer, and attempted to force the UK government to publicly acknowledge that 'fact', many of those who have closely followed the case agree that his denial was unconvincing. 91 He fled from Northern Ireland soon after the revelations, and was thought to be in Italy. 92 His unmasking was an embarrassment for the Provisional movement, which argued that the political machinations behind the outing of Stakeknife were an effort by British 'securocrats' to drive republicans into a demoralising bout of speculation and introspection; who else might be compromised? How many more informers lurked within the ranks, or even worse, within the leadership? Dissident (or dissenting) republicans certainly seized upon the Scappaticci revelations to further their argument that the infiltration of the Provisional leadership had been 'huge', and that 'Stakeknife damaged the IRA irreparably and helped pave the way for its defeat'. 93 However, the allegations by 'Martin Ingram' and, later, 'Kevin Fulton', were also potentially damaging for the UK government, whose security forces were being accused of permitting highly-placed agents to commit acts of terrorism, including murder, in order to maintain their cover. 94 So, if one of the prime motivations for the use of informers was to render the republican community increasingly paranoid, with its energies devoted to internal soul-searching, then it followed that at least some of these informers had to be publicly unmasked, in order to sow the seeds of confusion and demoralisation within republican ranks. However, this was not cost-free for the agencies of the state; cases such as 'Stakeknife' invited unwelcome critical scrutiny of the security forces, and the ethics of their intelligence-gathering. his death by exposing his location. 99 There has also been legal action by Donaldson's family, in an attempt to secure a journal that he had apparently been writing shortly before his killing, which was believed to be in the possession of the Irish police. By April 2016, ten years after his killing, an inquest into Donaldson's death had been adjourned on no fewer than eighteen occasions. was, 'in all likelihood, bogus', and part of a hidden agenda to undermine the peace process, and specifically to 'discredit the republican cause.' 110 In this view, the case raised important questions regarding the extent to which the Westminster government might be deliberately 
